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I. INTRODUCTION
In Winters v. United States, the United States Supreme Court established
the doctrine of federal reserved rights to water.' Over one hundred years later,
courts continue to define the exact contours of the doctrine and tribal assertions
of water rights are bitterly contested. This Article analyzes two of the last open
issues in the law of federal reserved rights to water: (i) whether tribal reserved
water rights apply to groundwater; and (ii) whether tribal federal reserved water
rights can exist in a non-prior appropriation system of water law.
The doctrine of federal reserved rights has been litigated almost exclusively
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1. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
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within the context of the prior appropriation system of water rights To date,
"[nmo court has adjudicated a tribal reserved rights claim in a riparian jurisdiction."' In fact, Felix Cohen's Hand Book of Federal Indian Law, the leading
Indian law treatise, definitively stated in 1982 that "iI] ndian water rights cannot
be understood apart from the prior appropriation system" of water law.' Read
in context, this statement was not meant to suggest that tribal reserved rights do
not exist in non-prior appropriation systems of water law. Rather, the statement
merely acknowledged that "Iti he doctrine of Indian reserved rights to water has
developed against the backdrop of the state prior appropriation system...
In regard to whether tribal reserved rights apply to groundwater, over the
last fifteen years the tide has definitively shifted towards finding such a right.6
The United States Supreme Court, however, has yet to rule on the issue. Additionally, all but one court to apply the reserved rights doctrine to groundwater
has done so in states with a prior appropriation system of groundwater management.7 Thus, one of the last unanswered questions in the law of tribal reserved
water rights is the question of whether tribal reserved rights extend to groundwater in a non-appropriation based system -of groundwater management. In
light of the persistent drought throughout the Southwestern United States, and
the increasing reliance on groundwater throughout the region, it remains one of
the most important unresolved issues.
A federal district court in California recently heard this issue in the case of

8
Agua Caiente Band of Cahuilla IncHans v. Coachella Valley Water Disrict.

On March 20, 2015, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California held that the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians ("Agua Caliente" or "Tribe") held reserved water rights that could encompass groundwater contained in the Coachella Valley Groundwater basin.' In so holding, the
court added to a growing body of authority extending tribal reserved water rights
to groundwater.'" Interestingly, because California manages its groundwater under a correlative rights framework, the case was only the second to find the
existence of such a right in a non-appropriation based system of water management." Recognizing the novelty and importance of this issue, the district court
certified an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the specific question of

2. SeeJudith V. Royster, Winters in the East: TribalReserved Jghts to Waterin Ripaian
States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POE'Y REv. 169, 169 (2000); but see In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 747-48 (Gila III)
(Ariz. 1999) (holding that tribes may seek Winters rights to groundwater despite Arizona's reasonable use system of groundwater management).
3. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 1206 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012)
[hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
4. RENNARD STRICKLAND ET AL-, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 576
(Reimard Strickland et al., eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN'S 1982 HANDBOOK].

5. See Royster, supra note 2, at 173.
6. See discussion infra Section II.C.
7. See Gila I1, 989 P.2d at 748.
8. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. EDCV 13883-JGB, 2015 WL 1600065, at * 1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015).
9. Id.at *7.
10. Infra Section II.C.
11. See Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065 at *11.
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"[w]hether Winters rights extend to groundwater, in light of California's correlative rights legal framnework for groundwater allocation...,,
The Ninth Circuit is the first federal court of appeals in over forty years to
directly address the issue of whether the Winters Doctrine extends to groundwater."3 Furthermore, because no federal court has addressed the question of
whether the Winters Doctrine applies in riparian jurisdictions, it is also the first
federal court of appeals to examine the general issue of whether the Winters
Doctrine applies in a non-prior appropriation system of water administration.
This question presents the Ninth Circuit with a unique opportunity to fully examine the underlying rationale, purpose, ard fundamental principles of the
Winters Doctrine. 4 In fight of the ninportance of this issue, this Article seeks to
build on existing scholarship and case law to present a comprehensive legal
framework for addressing the question of whether the Winters Doctrine extends to groundwater regardless of a state's system of water administration."
The Article proceeds in four parts. To put the arguments and issues in
context, Part II provides a brief overview of the relevant state systems of water
law and an introduction into the law of federal reserved water rights. Part II
also analyzes the current state of the law in relation to federal reserved rights to
water law. Part HI discusses the history and background that led to the Agua
Caliente litigation, and examines the court's decision to affum the Tribe's federal reserved right to groundwater. Part IV examines the open question of
whether tribal reserved rights apply to groundwater in light of California's correlative rights framework for groundwater allocation. Part IV also studies the
arguments being presented on appeal as to why the Winters Doctrine should
not apply outside a prior appropriation regime, and concludes by presenting a
12.

Id. at *I11*12.

13. As will be discussed infra Section I.C.1, in United States v. CappaerA 508 F.2d 313, 317
(9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth Circuit held that the reserved rights doctrine drdapply to groundwater.
However, the Supreme Court's subsequent holding that the water at issue was actually surface
water puts the validity of the Ninth Circuit's holding into question.
14. Over the years, as the Winters Doctrine became increasingly established, courts spent
"little time discussing the basis of the doctrine; litigation relates primarily to quantity and use of
water rather than whether water rights exist." See Taiawagi Helton, Indkin Reserved WaterRights
in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma, 33 TULSA LJ.979, 981 (1998).
15. Numerous authors analyzed the issue of whether federal reserved rights apply to groundwater. See,e.g., Judith V. Royster, Indrn 7ihalRights to Groundwater,15 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 489, 489 (Spring 2006). Most of these works, however, have stopped short ot fully analyzing the issue presented in Agua Cahente. See Stephen V. Quesenbeny et. al., 7 blia
Strategies
for Protectngand PreservingGroundwater, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 431, 453-54 (2015)
(noting that the Arizona Supreme Court considered "whether groundwater not subject to prior
appropriation under state law was susceptible to the federal reserved right of the Winters case[,]"
but acknowledging the unsettled nature of the issue); see alsoJoanna (Joey) Meldn-m, Reservaton and Quantilication of Indian GroundwaterRights in Caifornia, 19 HASTINGS W.N.W.J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 277 (2013) (acknowledging the Arizona Supreme Court's holding, but suggesting that California cownts should extend the Winters doctine to groundwater based on a
"recognition of the hydrological connection between ground and surface water"). Additionally,
other authors have discussed the issue of whether Winters rights exist in a riparian rights system
without discussing how those theories might impact the giroundwater question. See Royster, supra
note 2;Hope M. Babcock, Reserved ndian Water Rights in RianJur'sdicgons:Water, Water Everywhere, Perhaps Some Drops Ibr Us, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1203, 1203 (2006). Thus,
the purpose of this Article is to add to the existing body of scholarship on tribal reserved rights
by analyzing these two issues in conjunction as they have been presented to the court in Agua
Calkente.
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comprehensive legal framework for why Wjiters applies even in a correlative
rights system of water administration. Finally, Part V discusses the important
practical implications that could result from a favorable Ninth Circuit decision
for the Tribe.
II. STATE SYSTEMS OF WATER LAW AND FEDERAL RFERVED RIGHTS
A. PRIOR APPROPRIATION, RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND CORRELATIVE RIGHTS

The doctrine of prior appropriation reigns supreme in Western water law. 6
The prior appropriation system "establishes a firm and specific hierarchy
among users," through its "first in time, first in right" principle. 7 Rather than
correlating water rights with land ownership, the prior appropriation system
treats water as an independent usufructuary right.'8 Under the prior appropriation system, a water user obtains a water right by: (i) diverting water from its
natural course; and (ii) putting that water to beneficial use." The beneficial use
prong serves to define the extent of the right,' while the diversion prong establishes the right's priority.' Thus, under the prior appropriation system, those
who divert and put their water to beneficial use obtain a vested property right to
use a specific amount of water." In times of scarcity, those with rights "senior"
in time may claim priority over all those with rights "junior" in time."
The legal counterpart to the appropriative regime is the doctrine of riparianism. In riparian systems of water law, water rights are derived not from use,
but from land ownership." Under the riparian rights doctrine, water rights are
not subject to a priority-based system of administration, and rights holders are
not guaranteed a specific quantity of water.' Rather, "[elvery riparian landowner enjoys a right to make 'reasonable' use of [the] water" adjoining her property. 26
California's correlative rights system 2l of groundwater management closely

16. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, PriorAppropriation:A Reassessment 18 U. DENV. WATER
L. REV. 228, 229 (2015) (noting that seventeen western states have adopted the prior appropriaion system).

17. Reed D. Benson, Alive but Irrelevant The PiorAppropnation Doctrine in Today's
Western Water Law, 83 U. CoLo. L. REV. 675, 682 (2012).
18.

Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT. RE-

SOURCFSJ. 821, 927 (1995).
19. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 79 (5th ed. 2015).
20. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 n.7 (Colo.
1999).
21. See Benson, supra note 17, at 682.
22. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976).
23. Id.
24. See Benson, supra note 17, at 679; see also GEYCHES, supra note 19, at 57.
25. Benson, supra note 17, at 679.
26. Id.
27. California's system of groundwater management actually recognizes three types of water
rights: overlying, appropriaive, and prescriptive. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency,
5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000). As discussed above, the correlative right afforded an overlying
landowner serves as the dominant, and predominant, form of groundwater right, and is subject
only to the limitation of reasonable use. Id. Water users seeking to use water on land that does
not overlie the groundwater basin may acquire an appropriative right to use surplus groundwater
from a basin not in overdraft, but that right will be subordinate to the correlative rights of all
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mirrors rparianism.' In California, an "overlying" landowner has the inherent
right to withdraw all the groundwater "that he can beneficially use on his land[,]"
subject only to the correlative rights of other overlying landowners.' In times
of scarcity, correlative rights, like riparian rights, are apportioned equally among
overlying landowners." Under the correlative rights system, the pro rata share
of each overlying landowner is determined based "solely on his current reasonable and beneficial need for water."3 Thus, a landowner can neither lose a
correlative right through non-use nor can prior use of other landowners preempt that right."
B. FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS: THE WINTERS DOCTRINE
In Winters v. UnitedStates, the United States brought suit to assert its legal
right to water for the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation.' Under the May 1888
treaty establishing the reservation, the Milk River served as the northern boundary of the reservation, and the tribes utilized Milk River water for irrigation and
ranching." Concurrent with the tribes' initial use of water, however, non-Indian
irrigators began to divert Milk River water upstrean from the reservation.' In
1905, a drought prevented the tribes from receiving their full allotment of water,
and the Uited States brought suit to establish the priority and extent of the
tribes' water rights.'
The non-Indian irrigators claimed that they had successfully appropriated
a senior right to use 5,000 miners' inches of water prior to the United States' or
the Fort Belknap Reservation Indians' appropriation of Milk River water." The
Court, however, held that the exact date the tribes' began their diversions was
inconsequential; under the 1888 treaty the Federal Government impliedly reserved, and exempted from appropriationunder state law, all waters necessary
to fulfill the "federal government's purpose of transforming [the Indians] from
hunters and gatherers to a pastoral people."' As a result, the Court held that
the Fort Belknap Indians had a prior and paramount water right, which vested

overlying landowners within the basin. See Quesenberry, supra note 15, at 445. Additionally, in
over-drafted basins, where no surplus water exists, a water user may acquire a prescriptive right
through open and hostile use ofnon-surplus water for the statutory period of five years. Cahfonna
Water Serv. Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc., 224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 726 (Cal. Ct App.
1964).
28. See City ofBarstow,5 P.3d at 863.
29. Tehachapi-Cummings Cnty. Water Dist., v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975).
30. Id.; see alsoGETCHES, supra note 19, at 36; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1205.
31. See Tehachapi-Cummings Cnty. Water DisL, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
32. See id. ("The proportionate share of each of each owner is predicated not on his past use
over a specified peiod of time, nor on the ime he commenced pumping.. ."); see also GETCHES,
supra note 19, at 57.
33. 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908).
34. Id. at 565-67.
35. Id. at 567.
36. See COHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1208.
37. Winters, 207 U.S. at 568-69.
38. Id. at 576-77; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1208 (emphasis added).
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on May 1, 1888, to all the water necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reserva-

tion."
This

holding established the modem federal reserved rights
doctrine.'
Later Supreme Court cases affirmed the doctrine and further established its
governing principles."

In 1976, in Cappaerl v.Urned States, the Supreme

Court issued what leading water law authorities consider the "most succinct and
lucid statement of the governing principles of reserved water rights:""
[Wihen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain
and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves
appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish
the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquiresa reservedrightin unappropriatedwater which vests on the date ofthe reservation
and is superiorto the tights of future appropriators.4

The Court's language in Cappaertmakesclear one of the primary rationales
underlying the decision mi Winters was that "if [ithe] water had not been reserved, it would have been subject to appropriation by non-Indians under state
law."' The question that Agua Caliente presents, and which this Article explores, is whether the Winters Doctrine applies with equal force under a water
management system where a tribe has a present right to extract all the groundwater that it can put to beneficial use, subject only to the correlative rights of
other landowners.
C. FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS TO GROUNDWATER

As mentioned in Part I, there is a growing body of case law extending the
Winters Doctrine to groundwater.' The Supreme Court, however, has not spoken definitively on the issue, and consciously avoided its only chance to address
the question.' The following section analyzes cases to provide the necessary
context on the current state of the law related to federal reserved rights to
groundwater, and to show why the question on appeal in Agua Calienteremains
open despite these decisions.

39. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
40. See id.
41. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp.
383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
42.

COHEN'S 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 576; In State ofAnlzona v. State of Califor-

nia, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963), the Supreme Court expanded the doctrine of federal reserved
ights to apply to both Indian and non-Indian lands.
43. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (emphasis added).
44. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1981); but see, e.g.,
David H. Getches, The Unsettling of the West How Indians Got the Best Water Rights, 99
Mich. L. Rev. 1473, 1480-81 (2001) ("IRliparian law had been repudiated in Montana when the
Winters case was filed").
Cappaer 426 U.S. at 138; In re Gen. Adjudicaion of All Rights to Use Water
45. See, e.g.,
in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 751 n.6 (Ariz. 1999).
46. See Cappaer 426 U.S. at 142.
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1. Cappaert v. United States
Cappaert v. United States was the first and only United States Supreme
Court case to discuss the issue of whether federal reserved rights extend to
groundwater. 7 In Cappaert,the United States filed suit to assert federal reserved waters rights to an underground pool in Devil's Hole National Monument in Nevada and to enjoin a nearby ranch's groundwater pumping.' On
appeal from a district court ruling in favor of the United States, the Ninth Circuit
expressly held that the Winters Doctrine includes both surface water and
groundwater."
On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged both the Ninth Circuit's
holding and the fact that whether the doctrine of implied reservation of water
rights applied to groundwater remained an open question under Supreme
Court precedent. 5 The Court, however, chose to affirm on alternative grounds,
categorizing the water in the pool, not as groundwater, but as surface water."
Thus, in Cappaert, the Court expressly refused to extend the Wnite, -Doctrine
to groundwater. It held only that the United States could enjoin hydrologicallyconnected groundwater pumping when it interferes with a federal reserved right
to surface water." Additionally, in coming to this conclusion, the Court explained "Nevada itself may recognize the potential interrelationship between
surface and groundwater since Nevada applies the law of prior appropriation to
both."
While the Court in Cappaertdidnot expressly hold that the reserved rights
doctrine applies to groundwater, the opinion does contain language broadly defining the purpose of the Winters doctrine.' Specifically, the Court stated:
"since the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is based on the necessity
of water for the purpose of the federal reservaton, we hold that the United
States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is
, 5
ofsurface or groundwater."
Despite this broad language, it must nevertheless
be acknowledged that the Court had the opportunity to extend the Winters
doctrine to groundwater and consciously declined to do so.' Thus, the question
Cappaertleaves us with, is why did the Court refuse to extend the doctrine of
reserved rights to groundwater? Clearly, one explanation is simple judicial restraint, but restraint from what? One possible explanation is that the Court

47. Seeid.at 131.
48. 426 U.S. at 131-35.
49. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974). Interestingly, as a basis for
this holding, the court relied, at least in part, on the fact that Nevada applies the principles of
prior appropriation to both surface and groundwater. Id. at 317 n.4.
50. Cappaeiz 426 U.S. at 142.

51.

Id.

52.

See id. ("The federal water rights were being depleted because, as the evidence showed,

the (g)roundwater and surface water are physically interrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic
cycle." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
53. Id
54. See id. at 143.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 137, 142; see also Debbie Leonard, Doclnnal Uncertaintyin the Law of Fedcral
Reserved Water Rights: The PotentialImpact on Renewable Energy Development, 50 NAT.
RrsOURCFsJ. 611, 620 (2010).
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seemed to understand the legal difference between hydrologically-connected
groundwater and confined aquifers, and was, at the least, reluctant to broadly
extend the Winters doctrine to the latter.6'
2. Post-CappaertFinding a Reserved Right to Groundwater
Since Cappaert,almost every court to address the issue held that the Winlers Doctrine does extend to groundwater.' However, the first case to hint that
the Winters Doctrine should apply equally to groundwater and surface water
was actually decided pre-Cappaert,"and was relied on by the Ninth Circuit for
its conclusion that federal reserved rights applied to groundwater.' In Tweedy
v. Texas Company, the District Court for the District of Montana stated rather
clearly that while "It] he Winters case dealt only with the surface water,.., the
same implications which led the Supreme Court to hold that surface waters had
been reserved would apply to underground waters as well."" These implications, the court found, included the fact that water would make the arid land
more useful." Thus, according to the court, "whether the waters were found on
the surface of the land or under it should make no difference."'
While seemingly a strong statement in favor of applying the Winters Docnine to groundwater, the case has two serious limitations. First, the court did
not actually find a reserved right to groundwater, making the court's statement
classic dicta.' Second, underlying the court's decision was the fact that both
surface and groundwater were governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation.'
Accordingly, the decision provides little insight into whether "the same implications" underlying the Winters Doctrine hold true under a correlative rights
framework. In fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court later interpreted these "im-

57. See Cappaert 426 U.S. at 142.
58. Only one court has refused to extend the Winters Doctrine to groundwater. That decision, however, was not based on legal reasoning, but on a lack of precedent. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 99 (Wyo. 1988). In
" Itl
he logic which supports a reservation of surface
fact, the court in BgHorn acknowledged that
water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater." Id The
court simply refused to be the first court to extend the doctrine in that mainer. Thus, as later

courts, and most commentators have pointed out, the case has little bearing on the future of tribal
rights to groundwater. See, e.g., Michael C. Blurnm, I/nd/ian Reserved Water Rights,in 2 WATERs
AND WATiR RIGHTS § 37.02(d) (Amy K. Kelley, ed., 3rd ed. 2015). However, as one legal
commentator noted, "the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision
per curium, with a split court and without a written opinion." Liana Gregory, "Technically

Open": The Debate over Native American Reserved GroundwaterRights, 28 J. LAND RESOUR cES & ENvrL. L. 361,365 (2008) (citing Wyoming v. U.S., 492 U.S. 406, 407 (1989)). Thus,
like the decision in Cappaert,the Supreme Court's reluctance to review the case may indicate an
unwillingness on behalf of the Court "to explicitly extend the Winters doctrine to [alli groundwater sources..." Id.
59.

See United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974).

60.
61.
62.
63.

See id.
Tweedy v.Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968).
Id.
Id.

64. Id. at 386. In fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court relied on the fact that the court did not
actually "recognize a reserved groundwater right" as part of its rationale for refusing to follow the
court's decision. See In re BigHorn, 753 P.2d at 100.
65. Tweedy, 286 F. Supp. at 386.

Issue 2

A PROPERSEA TAT THE TABLE

plications" as explicitly requiring a hydrological connection between groundwater and surface water."
In addition to the strong dictum in Tweedy, in two other cases decided in
prior appropriation jurisdictions, courts have affirmatively found a reserved
right to groundwater." Both of these cases were premised on the general principle that the "the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is based on the
necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation," and thus, the
source of that water should not matter.' These two cases are important because
they affirn the broader purpose of tribal federal reserved rights. And they lend
valuable support for the notion that tribal reserved rights do, and should, apply
to groundwater. However, because both of these decisions took place against a
backdrop of prior appropriation, these courts were not forced to engage with
the specific issue on appeal in Agua Caliente.whether the tribes would have
had a federal reserved right to groundwater despite the existence of an equal
and correlative right under state law. Thus, like Tweedy, these cases fall just
short of supplying the comprehensive and necessary legal framework for resolving the issue.69
3. Gila IIT Winters Rghts Extend to GroundwaterDespite the State System
of Water Administat.on
Despite the fact that most cases involving reserved rights have been decided
within the context prior appropriation, one state supreme court expressly extended the Winters Doctrine to groundwater while acknowledging the tribe's
right to pump groundwater as an overlying landowner."0 In In re Gen. Adjudicanon of All -Rightsto Use Waterin Gila River Sys. & Source (" Gila III'), the
Arizona Supreme Court addressed the general question of whether federal reserved rights can extend to groundwater." Relying on the fact that the Cappaert
Court, held that federal reserved rights holders may prevent the diversion of
groundwater to protect surface water rights, the Gila IIlcourt held that federal
law does not differentiate between surface and groundwater "when identifying

66.

See In re Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 99 ("The logic which supports a reservation of surface

water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater. Certainly,
the two sources are often interconnected." (citing Tweedy, 286 F. Supp. at 385)).
67. See United States v.Washington Dept. of Ecology, No. C01-0047Z, slip op. at *8 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 24, 2003); The Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation
v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093,1097 (Mont. 2002). Since 1945, Washington has governed groundwater
by a comprehensive groundwater code that mirrors the state's prior appropriation-based permit
system foi surface water. See TIM BUTLER & MATTHEW KING, 23 WASH. PRAc., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND PRAcTIcE § 8.30 (2d ed.) (citing Schuh v. State Dept. of Ecology, 667 P.2d

64, 65 (1983)). Similarly, Montana's state water permitting system applies a prior appropriation
system to both surface and groundwater sources. See John B. Carter, Montana Groundwater
Lawin the Twenty-First Century,70 MONT. L. REV. 221, 235 (2009).
68. See ConfederatedSalish, 59 P.3d at 1099 (quoting CappaeZ 426 U.S. at 143); Washington, No. C01-0047Z, slip op. at *5-6.
69. See Gregory, supra note 58, at 367 (noting that the cases finding a reserved 6ight to
groundwater "provide little useful dicta or insight as to their decision to make such a monumental
holding, and generally passed over the issue without much discussion"); see also In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 751 n.6 (Ariz.
1999) (Gila II) (describing the Tweedy courts analysis of the issue as "relatively terse").
70. Gila IIl, 989 P.2d at 747-48.
71. Id.at745.
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the water to be protected."" Thus, the Gila IMIcourt held: "the significant queslion for the purpose of the reserved rights doctrine is not whether the waterruns
above or below the ground but whether it is necessaiy to accomplish the purpose ofthe reservation."
Importantly, the Arizona Supreme Court also addressed the more specific
issue of whether the general holding that reserved rights can apply to groundwater remained true in light Arizona's reasonable use system of groundwater
management." Thus, the case presented an almost identical issue to the one
being presented in Agua Cahlene.whether the United States impliedly reserved
groundwater "in a state that provides all overlying landowners an equal right to
pump as much groundwater as they can put to reasonable use upon their land.""
This argument, which the state water rights holders presented, gave the Gila III
court a unique opportunity to clarify the source and nature of federal reserved
rights. Rejecting the state law parties' arguments, the court stated clearly and
concisely that federal reserved water rights derive from federal law and "are by
nature a preserve intended to 'coninue[ I through years."".. Accordingly, the
court concluded that giving deference to Arizona's law, which extends all landowners the opportunity to pump as much groundwater as they can reasonably
use, did not adequately serve to protect federal rights." These fundamental
principles regarding the source and nature of federal reserved rights are at issue
in Agua Caliente,and the Ninth Circuit should take the opportunity to adopt
the basic principles enunciated by the Arizona Supreme Court.
Gila III, however, also contained an interesting limitation on the tribes' reserved rights to groundwater. The court held that "[a] reserved right to groundwater may only be found where other waters are inadequate to accomplish the
purpose of a reservation. "" The court gave no reasoning for this condition. But
one could read it as an acknowledgment of the fact that Winters rights are not
as easily reconciled in non-appropriation systems of water management, and the
court offering what it believed was a reasonable accommodation. Thus, while
the Arizona Supreme Court's holding stands as the strongest affirmation of
tribal groundwater rights to date, the court imposed a limitation further exemplifying the need for a broad federal appellate holding that confirms the existence of tribal reserved rights to groundwater. As one scholar pointed out,
"[blecause of state court determinations of tribal water rights.., the recognition

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 747.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 747-48.
Id. The common law doctrine of reasonable use "is essentially a rule of capture under

which landowners are allowed to withdraw as much water as desired in conjunction with the reasonable use of the landowner's property, regardless of the.consequences to neighboring landowners." L. William Staudenmaier, Between A Rock and A Dry Place: The Rural Water Supply
Challengefor Anzona, 49 ARiz. L. REv. 321, 328 (2007). Accordingly, there is an argument that
Arizona's system of reasonable use provides even less protection for Indian reserved rights than
California's system of correlative rights. However, as will be explained in further detail, all that
should matter is whether the state system conflicts with the nature and purpose of the federal
reserved rights, not the exact nature of the conflict.
76. G,la 11,989 P.2d at 747-48 (quofingWintersv. United States, 207 U.S. 564,577 (1908)).
77. Id. at 748.
78. Id.
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of groundwater rights varies from state to state." 9 And even "Isitates that do
clearly recognize the right may nonetheless limit it in ways that render groundwater generally unavailable as a primary source, rather than leave the determination of the best water source to the tribes themselves."'
III. AGUA CALENTE BAND OF CAHUmLA INDIANS V. COACHELLA VALLEY
WATER DISTICT
"The Coachella valley forms part of the Sonoran Desert, where water is
scarce.""' The Agua Caliente and the ancestral Cahuilla have occupied the
Coachella Valley and utilized its precious groundwater resources "since time
immemorial."" Historically, the Agua Caliente and their ancestors occupied
approximately 600 square miles of the Coachella Valley.' Groundwater was an
essential source of water for the ancestral Cahuilla, which was essential to meet
the ancestral Cahuilla's needs." Accordingly, the ancestral Cabuilla people employed numerous methods for developing and harnessing the groundwater re-

sources underlying their ancestral territory.'
Two separate Executive Orders in 1876 and 1877 established the modem
Agua Caliente Reservation which encompasses approximately 31,396 acres of
land."8 By establishing the reservation, the United States sought to provide a
permanent homeland for the Agua Caliente, sufficient to "meet the present and
future wants" of the tribe. It was never in doubt that water played a crucial role
in meeting those needs. In fact, in 1874, Mission Indians Special Agent John
Ames noted:
The great difficulty... arises not from any lack of unoccupied land, but from
lack of well-watered land. Water is an absolutely indispensable requisite for an
Indian settlement, large or small. It would be worse than folly to attempt to
locate them on land destitute of water, and that in sufficient quantity for purposes of irrigation...

79.

Royster, supra note 15, at 494-95.

80. Id.
81. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. EDCV 13883-JGB, 2015 WL 1600065, at *1, *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015) (emphasis added).
82. Agua Caicnte, 2015 WL 1600065, at *1, *9; Courtney Cole, "ForIncan Purposes:"
Explorig The Pole Of Water As A Cultural Resource In Secunng A Right To Groundwater
For The Agua Caliente Band Of Cahuilla Indians, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 409, 410 (2015).

83. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians' Mem. of Points and Auths. in Support of Mot.
for Sum. J. on Phase I Issues at 1, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley
Water Dist., No. ED CV 13-00883-JGB-SPX (C.D. Cal. E.D. Oct. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Agua
Caliente MSJI.
84. Id. at 2.
85. See Agua Caliente MSJ at 2 ("The pre-contact Cabuilla adapted to drought cycles in the
desert environment by developing naturally appearing springs and groundwater wells. Ancestral

Cahuilla, including the lineages of the Agua Caliente, dug walk-in wells as a water source during
times of water scarcity. The ancestral Caluilla used natural indicators of subsurface water to site
such wells and used the water that they produced for domestic consumptive use.").
86. Id. at 1; see alsoAgua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *1.
87. SeeAgua Caliente,2015 WL 1600065, at *3,*6 (internal quotations omitted).
88.

412.

Agua Caliente MSJ at 3 (internal quotations omitted); see also Cole, supra note 82, at
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This same sentiment reappeared in 1877, when the Commissioner of Indian Affairs instructed Mission Indian AgentJ.E. Colburn to identify additional
lands for the Agua Caliente reservation. " As Agent Colburn stated, his first
purpose "was to 'secure the Mission Indians with permanent homes, with land
and water enough, that each one who will go upon a reservation may have to
cultivate a piece of ground as large as he may desire."'"
Agua Caliente currently purchase their groundwater from the Coachella
Valley Water District ("CVWD") and the Desert Water Agency ("DWA") (collectively "Water Agencies")."' Experts have well documented California's unhealthy reliance on groundwater and issues with sustainable groundwater management."2 The Coachella Valley groundwater basin ("basin") is no exception.
For decades prior to the litigation, water users continuously and pulled from
the basin creating an unsustainable state of overdraft. ."Recognizing this reality,
Agua Caliente actively sought to engage the Water Agencies in discussions to
address their concerns regarding water quantity and water quality in the basin.
However, when these efforts failed, the Tribe initiated litigation "to ensure the
preservation and long tern availability of the high quality groundwater that is
critical to life and development for all Coachella Valley residents, and on which
the Tribe and its ancestors have relied since time immemorial."9"
A. THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMS THE TRIBE'S FEDERAL RESERVED
RIGHT TO GROUNDWATER
Agua Caliente sued the Water Agencies in May 2013 seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.' Specifically, the Tribe asked the court to: (i) recognize
their aboriginal right to groundwater; (ii) recognize their federal reserved right
to groundwater; (iii) enjoin the Water Agencies from withdrawing groundwater
from the basin in amounts that impermissibly interfere with these rights; and
(iv) enjoin the Water Agencies from continuing to augment the basin's groundwater supplies with untreated, imported water of lower quality than the pre-existing groundwater.' At the outset, the parties agreed to trifurcate the litigation,
89. See Cole, supra note 82, at 413.
90. Agua Cahente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *3(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).

91. Id. at * 2- *3 ("The CVWD is a county water district, and is responsible for developing
groundwater wells in the Coachella valley and extracting groundwater. The DWA is an 'independent special district' created to provide water to the city of Palm Springs and areas that surround it by developing groundwater wells and extracting groundwater.").
92. See, e.g., Colleen Shalby, Even Scarier Than California'sShrinking Reservoirs Is Its
Slinlking GroundwaterSupply, PBS NEVSHOUR (Mar. 20, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.pbs.
org/newshour/rundown/califonias-groundwater-loss-mean-enfire-u-s.
93. See COACHELLA VALLEY WATER DIST., CroundwaterReplenishment & Imported Water, http://www.cvwd.org/162/Grotudwater-Replenishment-Imported-Water (last visited April 8,

2016).
94. See Cole, supra note 82, at 414; see geneia]l

AGUA CAIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA
Water Issues: CorrespondenceBetween the Agua Caliente Band of CahuillaIndians
and the United States, Desert Water Agency, and Coachella Valley Water Distnc4 1996-2012,
http://www.coachellacleanwater.org/downloads/Water9620Issues%20%2OPart%2011_Reduced.pdf (last visited April 8, 2016) [hereinafter AGUA CALIENTE CORRESINDIANS,

PONDENCE].
95. AGUACALIENTECORRESPONDENCE, supm note 94, at l.

96. Agua Callente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *2.
97. See Complaint at 15-20, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley

A PROPERSEA TA TTHE TABLE

Issue 2

and Phase I" dealt exclusively with the legal questions of whether Agua Caliente
had a federal reserved right to groundwater under the Winters doctrine and
whether the Tribe had an aboriginal right to groundwater."
Notably, the Tribe and the Water Agencies also stipulated that the groundwater at issue is in a confined aquifer and "does not add to, contribute to or
support any surface stream from which the Tribe diverts water.. ."" This stipulation made clear that the groundwater at issue was subject to California's correlative rights system of groundwater administration,"' which according to the
court, put the groundwater at issue "uncomfortably outside Cappaert'sexplicit
holding." ' Thus, the Water Agencies' argument consisted of two parts: (1) as
a general rule, federal reserved rights do not extend to groundwater; and (2)
even if they can, they do not impliedly exist when the Tribe has a correlative
right to groundwater under California law."3
In regard to whether Winters rights can extend to groundwater, the court
framed the issue as one of appurtenance."' Using Cappaertasits touchstone,
the court interpreted the legal constraints under Winters as whether: "(i) the
reserved water is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation and (ii) the
reserved water is appurtenant to the reserved land.'.. Applying these basic principles, the court concluded that while "[a]ppurtenance, as that term is used by
the Winters doctrine, must provide some legal limitation to imphedly reserved
water rights... that limit should not be drawn between surface and groundwater
sources."" Accordingly, in conformity with Gila III,and the growing body of
case law, the court ultimately held that as long as the groundwater in question is
appurtenant to the reservation, and necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation,'°' Winters rights can extend to and include groundwater resources. '
As to the issue of whether the Winters Doctrine applies even under a correlative rights framework for groundwater management, the court handled this
Water District, No. ED CV 13-00883-JGB-SPX (C.D. Cal. E.D. May 14, 2013).
98. See Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *2 (Subsequent phases will deal with the questions of: "(1) the ownership of certain 'pore space' beneath the reservation; (2) the legal question
of whether a right to a quantity of groundwater encompasses a right to water of a certain quality;
and (3) some of the equitable defenses asserted by the CVWD and DWA.").
99. See id. at *2,*10-*11 (The court found that the Congressional Act of 1851, passed
shortly after California's admission into the United States, extinguished the Tribe's claim to aboriginal right to groundwater. That issue is not currently on appeal and this Article does not examine any of the issues sunounding the court's decision in regard to that claim.).
100. Id. at *3.
101. Id.at*11.

102.

Id.

103. Id. at *2;T mscript of Oral Argument at 16, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.
Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. EDCV 13-00883-JGB-SPX (C.D. Cal. E.D. Mar. 16, 2015)
[hereinafter Oral Argument Transcript] ("We're asking the Court to rule that as a matter of law
if an Indian tribe has the right to use groundwater under California law, and it has an equal and
conelative right to use the groundwater with everybody else, then under those circumstances, as
a matter of law, there can be no federally-reserved right.").
104. Id. at *4, *6.

105. Id.
106. Seeid.at*7.
107. The court also made clear that the question of whether particular groundwater resources
are necessary to fulfill tie purpose of the reservation goes not to the existence of the right, but to
the anmount of the right. Id. at "4,*7.
108. Seeid. at*6. *7.ee
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by stating bluntly: "It is neither novel nor controversial that Winters rights derive
from federal law, and thus displace state law when in conflict."" However, unlike the Arizona Supreme Court in Gila III,the court failed to clearly articulate
the exact conflict between California's correlative rights framnework and federal
reserved rights law.' 0 While the court did note that existing case law specifically
held that courts should not 'balance' competing interests to determine the scope
of reserved rights under Winters, (possibly referencing the requirement of correlative rationing) the court did not discuss or articulate any of the particulars of
the correlative rights doctrine necessary to make such an association."'
And while the court in Agua Cal'entemay not have provided the same level
of detail in its analysis as in that of Gila III,its decision was a straightforward,
concise, and logical application of the Winters Doctrine that adds substantially
to the body of case law extending the Winters Doctrine to groundwater."' Additionally, and importantly, the court also expressly applied the Winters DocIrine to groundwater outside a prior appropriation system of management.
IV. THE OPEN QUESTION: WHETHER TRIBAL FEDERAL RESERVED
RIGHTS APPLY TO GROUNDWATER IN LIGHT OF CALIFORNIA'S
CORRELATIVE RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR GROUNDWATER ALLOCATION
Acknowledging the lack of precedent on the issue, and the fact that "Islubstantial ground for difference of opinion exists[,]" the district court in Agua Caliente certified an interlocutory appeal to address the question of "[wlhether
Winters rights extend to groundwater, in light of California's correlative rights
legal framework for groundwater allocation."". The question presents the Ninth

109. Id. at *8. The court also relied on the fact that the newly passed California Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act "acknowledges the supremacy of federal water rights, and acquiesces in their priority." Id. The relevant section the court relied on states: "IlIn the management
of a groundwater basin or sub-basin by a groundwater sustainability agency or by the board, federally reserved water rights to groundwater shall be respected in full." Cal. Water Code
§10720.3(d) (2015). While this is most certainly persuasive authority for the proposition that
those in the California state legislature believe that federal reserved rights do extend to groundwater, the California legislature is clearly not in a position to authoritatively interpret federal common law. Additionally, the statute expressly states that it is merely "declaratory of existing law."
Id. However, the ultimate state of existing law is (1) unclear; and (2) within the exclusive purview
of the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, because the purpose of this Article is to provide a thorough and persuasive legal framework for why the Winters doctrine extends to groundwater regardless of a state's system of water administration, this Article does not expound upon
this basis for the court's decision. That being said, the provision discussed above, and the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act as a whole, underscores the importance of a
Ninth Circuit decision affirming Aqua Caliente's federal reserved right to groundwater. California's recently passed Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, will require high and medium
priority basins to be managed under a groundwater sustainability plan or coordinated groundwater sustainability plans byJanuary 31, 2020. See Quesenbeny, supra note 15, at 446. Absent an
adjudicated federal reserved right to a specific quantity of groundwater, the Tribe's water right
will be limited at the outset by the conelative tight doctrine of reasonable use. See infra notes
144-48 and accompanying text.
110. See Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *8. Also, despite citing Gila HI/for the proposition that federal reserved rights can extend to groundwater, the court failed to cite the case to
support this part of its analysis.
111. Id.
112. See Agua Caiente,2015 WL 1600065, *4-*9.
113. Id.at*11-*12.
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Circuit with a unique opportunity to fully examine the underlying rationale, purpose, and fundamental principles of the Winters Doctrine, and to fill a gap in
existing tribal reserved rights jurisprudence. Accordingly, this Part first examines the arguments the litigants presented on appeal as to why the Winters doctrine should not apply outside a prior appropriation regime. It concludes by
encouraging the Ninth Circuit to clearly articulate a comprehensive legal framework for why the Whiters Doctrine applies regardless of a state's water administration system.
A. THE WATER AGENCIES' ARGUMENTS: THE NEW, AND JUST AS
INSENSITIVE, SENSITIVITY DOCTRINE
The Water Agencies' arguments on appeal are equally grounded in law and
policy - both of which get to the very heart of the Winters doctrine. The legal
arguments are simple. The Water Agencies argue that because the Tribe has
an existing and equal right to use groundwater, "the rationale of the Winters
doctrine- which was to protect Indian water rights from being subordinate to
the water rights of non-Indian users - does not apply to the groundwater" at
issue in this case."' This argument is premised on the interrelated notions that
"[tihe reserved rights doctrine is a 'doctrine built on implication, ' '.. 5 and that the
implication to reserve water derives from the fact that "if [the] water had not
been reserved, it would have been subject to appropriation by non-Indians under state law.", ' Thus, "Iblecause the Indians were not in a position, either
economically or in terms of their development of farming skills, to compete
with non-Indians for water rights, it was reasonable to conclude that Congress
intended to reserve water for them.""'
These two premises, when combined, lead to the Water Agencies' main
argument: Because the Tribe has always had the right to withdraw all the
groundwater it can put to beneficial use, and the Tribe could not lose that right
despite other appropriation, 8 "there is no basis for an 'implication' that Presidents Grant and Hayes... intended to reserve a right in groundwater that would

114. Joint Brief of Appellants Coachella Valley Water, et. al, and Desert Water Agency, et al.
at 35, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist. et al., No. 1555896, at 35 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Appellant Opening Brief]. The Water Agencies
also frane this argument in terms of whether the question of necessity goes to the existence or
scope of the right, arguing that a federal reserved right exists only if "the prposes of the reservation would be entirelydefeated' without the right. Id. at 21 (quoting United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978)). Because this is a corollary of the Water Agencies' primary argument,
this Article does not explore the specific contours of this argument. But it should be noted that
the question of whether New Mexico's primary/secondary distinction applies to Indian reserved
lights in the Ninth Circuit is an interesting question of law and a possibly troubling proposition

for tribes.
115. Id. at 42 (quoting New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715).
116. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that
in the seminal reserved rights cases of Winters and Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963):
"if water had not been reserved, it would have been subject to appropriation by nonIndians under state law. lAndl Iblecause the Indians were not in a position, either economically or in tenns of their development of fa ning skills, to compete with nonIndians for water rights, itwas reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to reserve
water for them").
117. Id.
118. See Tehachapi-Cumnings Cnty. Water Dist.v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal.
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exempt the Tribe from the principles of equality and sharing that apply to all
other users of groundwater." "9 This line of reasoning has found some support
amongst commentators and academics when discussing whether the Winters
Doctrine applies to groundwater and whether the Winters Doctrine applies in
riparian states." According to at least one legal scholar:
The lesson then that the 1'inteisdoctrine ought to teach is that when the
federal government reserves some part of the public domain from entry,
the federal government implicitly reserves for that land the same sort of
right to use water as prevails in the state in which the land is located.' 2'
And while there is some facial logic to these arguments, as will be discussed
in further detail below, they ultimately misconstrue the source, scope, and purpose of tribal reserved rights.
The Water Agencies' policy arguments are equally as simple, but slightly
more troubling. The Water Agencies contend that if the court grants the Tribe
a federal reserved right to groundwater, that right would be senior and paramount to the current landowners' existing rights and would jeopardize other
overlying landowners' rights to the groundwater that they have used and relied
on for decades.'2 Accordingly, the Water Agencies argue that these "adverse
consequences and impacts" need to be taken into account and that "the reserved rights doctrine should be applied with 'sensitivity'to 'its impact upon
those who have obtained water rights under state law and to Congress' general
policy of deference to state water law.'"'"
For this argument, the Water Agencies rely on a quote fromJustice Powell's
dissent in United States v. New Mexico, which introduced the judicial concept
known as the "sensitivity doctrine" into the realm of federal reserved rights.'
Later, an unpublished draft opinion authored by Justice O'Connor in Wyormng v. United States made the doctrine infamous. In that opinion, Justice
O'Connor wrote that "the quantification of Indian reserved water rights requires
a 'sensitivity to the impact on state and private appropriators of scarce water

Ct. App. 1975); see also Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 114, at 42.
119. Appellant Opening Brief, supranote 114, at 42 (emphasis added).
120. See Leonard, supra note 56, at 622 (noting that whether a federal reserved right to
groundwater exists "turms on the groundwater regime followed by each individual state"); see also
Debbie Shosteck, Beyond Reserved Raghts: Tribal Control over GroundwaterResources in A
Cold Winters Climate, 28 CoLuM.J. ENVTL. L. 325, 338-40 (2003) (noting that despite the Ari-

zona Supreme Court's decision in Gila IJI, the Supreme Court "will likely reject the idea of a
reserved right to groundwater" because "lais long as Indian rights are treated evenhandedly under
state law, the Court would determine that no federal rule is necessary").
121. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparnanism, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §
9.06(b)(2) (Amy K. Kelley, ed., 3rd ed. 2015).
122. Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 114, at 65; see also Quesenberry, supranote 15, at
456 ("Because there is no 'correlative rights' principle applicable to the federally reserved right,
it has the potential to completely preempt 'reasonable use' of the groundwater by other overlying
landowners.").
123. Appellant Opening Brief, supranote 114, at 60 (quoting NewMexico, 438 U.S. 438 U.S.
696, 718 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)).
124. See Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in
Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 707 (1997).
125. 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
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under state law." 26 The draft opinion was never published because Justice
O'Connor was forced to recuse herself from the case, I" but the fact that the
Supreme Court was prepared to adopt" the sensitivity doctrine prior to Justice
O'Connor's recusal has led some to suggest that '[t]
his unofficial declaration of
the Court's attitude towards reserved rights indicates its inclination to curtail
rather than expand the reserved rights doctrine.""
Here, the Water Agencies have taken the sensitivity doctrine to its logical
extreme, suggesting that the court should use it not at the quantification stage,
but to preclude the very existence of reserved rights to groundwater. Accordingly, in California - where water and property are sacrosanct - the possible
force of these arguments'" makes a strong affirmation of both the legal principles and the policy rationales underlying the Winters Doctrine particularly important.
B. WINTERSRIGHTS ARE CREATURES OF FEDERAL LAW THAT PROVIDE
FOR BOTH THE PRESENT AND FUTURE NEEDS OF THE TRIBE
In discussing the question of whether the Winters Doctrine should apply
in riparian jurisdictions, Professor Judith Royster articulated three fundamental
principles of Winters rights relevant to the Agua Cal'entelitigation: (i) because
Winters rights are derived from federal law, they are paramount to state-law
water rights and "nothing in state law can operate to the derogation of those
federal-law tribal rights;" (ii) Winters rights include the amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation; and (iii) the rights, either reserved
to or by tribes, were reserved in perpetuity.''
As to the first fundamental principle, the Supreme Court made clear, on
numerous occasions, that federal reserved rights are creatures of federal law.'.'
The Court has expressed this interplay between federal and state law most
clearly when discussing the role of the McCarran Amendment in adjudicating
federal reserved rights. Because the McCarran Amendment waived the United
States' sovereign imm-mity, and provided "state courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights held in trust by the United States 1," the Court was
forced to address this effect in terms of the law governing federal reserved

126. Id. at 6 8 4 (quoting Wyonming v. United States, Opinion, 2d Draft at 15, No 88-309 (U.S.
1989) (recirculated June 12, 1989)).
127. Id. at 684-685.
128. See Dan Tarlock et al., Water Resource Management: A Casebook in Law and Public
Policy 764 (7th ed. 2014) (noting that "research into the late Thurgood Marshall's papers revealed
a draft majority opinion by Justice O'Connor for a 5-4 majority" that "would have moditied the
PIA standard applying a 'sensitivity docuine' whenever junior water rights of non-Indians would
be put at risk by the recognition of reserved rights").
129. Shosteck, supranote 120, at 344.
130. Shosteck, supra note 120, at 341 (arguing that the Supreme Court will likely decline to
apply the Winters doctrine to gioundwater because "[in the context of groundwater, federal reserved rights could be extremely disruptive to existing state systems"); Gwendolyn Griffith, Indian
Clains to Groundwater" Reserved Rights or Beneficial Interest?, 33 STAN. L. REv. 103, 130
(1980) ("[Aipplying the traditional reservation theory to Indian groundwater rights leads to inefficient and inequitable results.").

131. SeeRoyster, supranote2, at 174, 181, 182.
132. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976).
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rights." 3 In Arizona v. San CaitosApache Tribe ofArizona, the Court made
clear that the McCarran Amendment "in no way changes the substantive law by
which Indian rights in state water adjudications must be judged. State courts, as
much as federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law.' 3.
This fundamental principle informed the decision in Gila IIIand was also
how the district court resolved the issue in Agua Callente." The issue, however,
is that the federal law is not clear regarding reserved rights to groundwater.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court, may still decline to
"create new federal common law" in favor of deferring to state law.' Under
existing Supreme Court precedent, a court will defer to state law: "(1) if there is
no need for a uniform national rule; (2) if the use of state law would not impede
federal policy or functions; and (3) if the creation of an incompatible federal
rule would have calamitous consequences for state and private landowners." 7
This has led to the suggestion that despite growing precedent in favor of the
tribes, when the Supreme Court is called upon to resolve federal claims to
is
groundwater, it will most likely defer to state law." Accordingly, while "[i]t
neither novel nor controversial that Winters rights derive from federal law,"'3 it
is crucial that the Ninth Circuit clearly articulates and affirms that federal law
serves as the exclusive source of those rights.
Directly related to the source of the right, is the nature and scope of the
right. Because Winters rights only "displace state law when in conflict,]" it is
important that the Ninth Circuit clearly articulates the conflict that exists between correlative rights and federal reserved rights." In this case, the conflict is
obvious: tribal reserved rights need not accommodate other users;'4' and tribal
reserved rights are not based solely on the tribe's current need for water, rather
tribal reserved rights also look to the future."' Under California's correlative

133.

See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 548-49 (1983).

134. Id.at 571. The fact that federal reserved rights are creatures of federal law is also readily
apparent from the fact that federal reserved rights stand in direct conflict with state appropriative
rights. See Montana v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712
P.2d 754, 762, (Mont. 1985) (noting that "Itlhe doctrine of reserved water rights conflicts with
prior appropriation principles in several respects"); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supia note 3,
at 1205-06.
135. Inre Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d
739, 747 (Gila III) (Ariz. 1999); Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley
Water Dist., No. EDCV 13-883-JGB, 2015 WL 1600065, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015).
136. See Shosteck, supra note 120, at 342.
137. Id.at 339 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979) and
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 673 (1979)).
138, Id.at 338.
139. Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *8.
140. Id.; see also Wilson, 442 U.S. at 672-73 (stating that the determination of whether to
apply federal law relies in part on "whether application of state law would frustrate federal policy
or functions").
141. See Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *8; see also Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 752 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1985); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1205
("Indian reserved rights are not reduced.., in time of shortage").
142. See Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *6 ("IWinters rights anticipate increased or
novel future uses"); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. &
Source, 989 P.2d 739, 748 (Gila III) (Ariz. 1999) ("[Aln implied reservation includes sufficient
waters 'to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the Indian Reservations.'" (quoting
Ai. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963))); see also United States v. Alitanum Irrigation Dist., 236
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rights framework, however, if the quantity of water in the basin were deemed
insufficient, the Tribe would receive only its "proportionate fair share" of water
based "on [its]
current reasonable and beneficial need for water."'" Because
this could effectively preclude the Tribe from withdrawing the full quantity of
water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, the application of the
correlative rights framework would frustrate federal policy and create a high
"likelihood of injury to federal trust responsibilities land] to tribal possessory
interests."'"
The court in Gila Ilrelied on a similar conflict when it held that "a] theoretically equal right to pump groundwater, in contrast to a reservedright,would
not protect a federal reservation from a total future depletion of its underlying
aquifer by off-reservation pumpers."" And the only state court to exanine this
issue within the context of riparian rights came to a similar conclusion, noting
that "[rleasonable use... does not necessarily comport with a riparian owner
'
having a sufficient quantity or quality of water to achieve a certain purpose. ."
Thus, as the Agua Caliente correctly argued to the district court: "the California
correlative rights doctrine is simply not an adequate substitute for federally-reserved rights ....It is up to the Ninth Circuit to make this clear.
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD AFFIRM THE INDIAN LAW PRINCIPLES
THAT SERVED AS THE FOUNDATION FOR WINTERS

While it is essential that the Ninth Circuit affirm the fundamental legal principles that define the source, nature, and purpose of tribal reserved rights, these
very principles - and the inherent conflict they create with California's correlative rights system - are what fuel the Water Agencies' policy arguments." Thus,
a comprehensive reproach to the Water Agencies' revival of the sensitivity doctrine must also include an affirmation of the policy considerations underlying
the Winters Doctrine.
Winters was not "merely a water law case." "' Rather, the Court grounded
Winters in the most basic of Indian law principles: courts are to construe Indian
laws and treaties favorably to the Indians." This principle, originating in the
Supreme Court case United States v. Winans, ' serves as the true basis for the
F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1956).
143. Tehachapi-Cummings Cnty. Water Dist., v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal. Ct
App. 1975).
144. See Wilson, 442 U.S. at 673.
145. 989 P.2d at 748.
146. See Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Virginia, No. 3001 -RW/RC, 2007 WL 6002103, at *14
(Va. Cir. Feb. 5, 2007) ("IIt is plausible that even in a riparian jurisdiction it may be necessary to
imply reserved water pursuant to an Indian reservation or treaty-granted right. Common law
riparianism only grants a riparian owner 'a reasonable use of the water.., without sensible alteration in quality or unreasonable diminution in quantity.'... Reasonable use, howeve,, does not
necessarilycomport with a riparan ownerhavingasuflicientquantity orqualityol water to achi'eve
a certainpurpose." (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
147. Oial Aigument Transcript, supra note 103, at 21.
148. See Getches, supra note 44, at 1486.
149. id.at 1486.
150. Richard B. Collins, 77je Future Course of the Winters Docine, 56 U. CoLO.L. REV.
481, 482 (1985).
151. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
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Winters decision and the ultimate rebuke to the Water Agencies' line of argument.12 This is because, inherent in the Water Agencies' reasoning, is the notion that the Tribe should have the same rights as all overlying landowners.'"
However, tribes are not "merely property owners within their reservations, but
governments that entered into relations with the United States."' Thus, as Professor Royster noted, the Court construed Winans as standing for the principle
"that if an Indian tribe has nothing under a treaty that it would not have without
the treaty, then the treaty is a nullity."'"
Professor Royster relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Washington
v. Washington State CommercialPassengerFishing Vessel Association" as the
basis for this argument.'"' In that case, the Supreme Court rejected an argument
that certain treaty language (granting tribes the "right of taking fish... in common with all citizens of the Territory") gave the tribe merely an equal right to
take fish with non-Indians.' 8 Instead, relying on Winans and its progeny, the
Court held: "Whatever opportunities the treaties assure Indians with respect to
fish are admittedly not 'equal' to, but are to some extent greater than, those
9
Because the Court grounded Winters in the same
afforded other citizens."'5
Indian law principles that informed the decision in Washington State Commercial,the same premise that held true for salmon should hold true for water."

152.

See Getches, supra note 44, at 1484; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at

1208-09. Doctrinally, Winters rights and Winans rights have come to encompass two separate
and distinct categolies of reserved rights. Winans rights "preserveli a pre-existing use of water[,I"
whereas Winters rights allow for the creation of new uses necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
reservation. See, e.g., Aubri Goldsby, The Mccarran Amendment and Groundwater: Why
Washington State Should RequireInclusion of Groundwater in GeneralStream Adjudikations
Involving FederalReserved Water Rights, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 185, 189 n.33 (2011) (citing United

States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408-15 (9th Cir. 1983)). This distinction, however, does not
alter the fact that both types of rights are grounded in the foundational Indian law principle that
treaties are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, nor the argument that this principle
should inform the decision in the Aqua Calientecase. See United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co.,
600 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging the Winans "rule of interpretation" as the
basis for the decision in Winters); see also Babcock, supra note 15, at 1240 (noting that "[qiuestions of fairness pervade the issue of Indian water rights" (quoting Charles F. Wilkinson, The
Future of Western Water Law and Policy, in Indian Water 1985: Collected Essays 55 (Christine
L. Miklas & StevenJ. Shupe eds., 1986)).
153. See Roytser, supra note 2, at 193.
154. Id. at 193-94.
155. Id. at 194. The same basic principles hold true for reservations created by Executive
Order, as the Winters doctrine and, "the nle of liberal construction," apply with equal force to
reservations created by Executive Order. See Colville Confederated Tribes v.Walton, 647 F.2d
42, 46 n.7, 47 n.9 (9th Cir. 1981).
156. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S.
658, 661 (1979).
157. See Royster, supra note 2, at 194 n. 120.
158.

Washington State Commercial,443 U.S. at 659.

159. Id. at 677 n.22. The Arizona Supreme Court also relied on the Court's decision in
Washington State Commercial,but its reasoning was grounded in the fact that under Arizona's
reasonable use doctrine, an "equal right to pump groundwater" results in a direct competition
with non-Indian pumpers for a finite resource. See In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 748 (Gila III) (Ariz. 1999). While similar, this
rationale is not directly applicatble to California's correlative rights framework, where the Tribe's
right to its proportionate share would be protected.
160. In fact, in upholding the district court's apportionment of the state's salmon fishery between tribal and non-tribal entities, the court looked to the principles enunciated in its reserved
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In other words, whatever reserved water rights the tribes hold as a result of the
treaty and treaty-substitutes establishing their reservations, they are inherently
"greater than, those afforded other citizens." ' Deferring to California's correlative rights framework would contradict this most basic of Indian law principles
62
- and the policies of sovereignty and self-determination that inform it.'
Based on this reasoning, it is clear that when one views the Winters doctrine
not as a "water law case," but as an "Indian law case," the Water Agencies' policy
arguments lose all force. As noted by the esteemed Professor Getches: "If Winters 'fits' anywhere, it Is wit'n Inchanlaw's historicalfradoiion of sustaiaingfiibal
rights whether or not broaderpolicy interests are served.'"" Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit should take this opportunity to not only affirm the source and
nature of federal reserved water rights, but also to clearly affirm and articulate
the important Indian law principles on which this doctrine rests.
V. CONCLUSION: PROVIDING TRIBES IN CALIFORNIA A PROPER SEAT AT

TE TABLE
Agua Caliente is the first tribe in California to assert a reserved right to
groundwater.'64 The Agua Caliente filed suit to protect the groundwater resources they rely on and to give themselves a voice in the management of those
rights."' A Ninth Circuit holding which allows tribes to pursue a Winters right
to groundwater is essential to providing that voice not only for the Agua Caliente, but also for tribes throughout the state.'"
As a practical matter, negotiated settlement is the most conmon method
for determining the scope of federal reserved rights. "' In California, however,
negotiated settlements to tribal water rights are just beginning, and only one
tribal settlement agreement to date has included "groundwater as part of the
federally reserved water right" or has "addressed in any detail, or at all, groundwater protections or quantification.'." This is no surprise. Traditionally, the
rights cases, stating: "In those cases, after determining that at the time of the treaties the resource
involved was necessary to the Indians' welfare, the Court typically ordered... some apportionment that assured that the Indians' reasonable livelihood needs would be met." Washiigton
State Conmnercial, 443 U.S. at 684-85; see also Royster, supianote 2, at 194 n.120 (noting that

"the Court drew an express analogy to reserved water rights" that "helps clarify that the Court, in
fashioning the tribal reserved water rights doctrine, did not intend tribal water rights to be determined by state law principles.").
161. Washington State Commercial,443 U.S. at 677 n.22.
162. Acknowledging the Indian law pohcies of sovereignty, self-sutficiency, and autonomy as
the fundamental policies underlying the Winters Doctrine is important in this context. This is
because many of the normative reasons for applying the Winters Doctrine in a prior appropriation state do not necessarily apply under California's correlative rights framework. See Babcock,
supranote 15, at 1240 (noting the "inapplicability of arguments based on [historical] federal water
policies" in riparian jurisdictions).
163. Getches, supra note 44, at 1493 (emphasis added).
164. Quesenbeny, supra note 15, at 458.
165. See Brett Walton, CaliforniaIndian Tribe Pursues Rigbts to Groundwater,CiitcLE OF
BLUE (luly 28, 2015), http://www.circleofblue.org/watemews/2015/world/california-indian-tribepursues-rights-to-giroundwater/ (last visited April 8, 2016).
166. Id.
167. See Quesenberry, supranote 15, at 460.
168. Id.at 460, 464-65; see also Meldrum, supranote 15, at 278 (noting that in general, tribal
reserved water rights, whether to surface or groundwater, have not played as prominent a role in
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priority and potential size of Indian reserved rights have provided the "incentive
for parties to seek negotiated settlements of Indian water rights claims.' 6 9 Thus,
if it is unclear whether such a right even exists, there is no pressure to include
those rights in the settlement. ' And this is exactly what happened to Agua
Caliente. Prior to initiating litigation, the Tribe engaged in ongoing discussions
with the Water Agencies and attempted to broker a memorandum of agreement to engage in formal settlement discussions. ' The Water Agencies, however, responded that it was their "belief that the Tribe holds neither aboriginal
rights nor reserved rights to groundwater."7 . The Water Agencies informed the
'
there are to be 'meaningful'discussions, we need to know the
Tribe, that " /if
bases for your claims.'. 3 The current litigation seeks to provide that basis. 7 '
Some have characterized the lasting iplication of the Winters Doctrine as
returning "tribal governments to their rightful seat at the table to detemine the
future of [their] shared water resource in the process of settling Indian water
rights .... Clearly, this "rightful seat" is a product of leverage. In other words,
nobody offered the tribes a seat at the table before the courts held that they
rightfully belonged there. Therefore, a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirming the application of the Winters Doctrine to al sources of
groundwater is an essential step in ensuring that tribes throughout California are
given "their rightful seat" in protecting and managing theirwater.

California water law and water management as they have in other western states).
169. Mergen, supra note 124, at 685. In fact, one of the key elements that defines tribal water
settlements, is that the tribe "will accept smaller amounts of direct diversion water rights than
would normally be allocated in litigation." Celene Hawkins, Beyond Quantitication:Implementing andSustaining Tribal Water Settlements, 16 U. DENY. WATER L REv. 229, 236 (2013).
170. See Quesenberry, supra note 15, at 464 (noting that "Itihe Agla Caliente case highlights
this gap in the protection of federally reserved water rights and serves to focus attention on
groundwater as an essential component of the federal right and the need for tribes to specifically
address its protection and quantification in those situations where it serves as a source of tribal
water.").
171. See AGUA CAIErNTE CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 95, at 157 (letter from Redwine &
Sherrill to Keith Harper and Steven Moore (Nov. 13, 2012)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. SeeWalton, supranote 165.
175. Barbara Cosens, The Legacy of Winters v. United States and the Winters Doctrne, One
Hundred Years Later, in THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS:
THE WNTERSCENTENNAL 5 (Barbara Cosens andJudith V. Royster eds., 2012).

